Finnish Political Strike Wave

Tags

Finland, history, labor, politics

Background; the Far Right (Finns Party) Minister of Finance https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Riikka_Purra is seen as the main figure driving the Right wing government’s programme of major cuts and further ‘liberalisation’ of the economy. (The Government is a coalition of the Conservative NCP, the Finns Party, and 2 minor parties) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Finnish_parliamentary_election#Government_formation . Though an apparent turnaround on pre-election promises, perhaps they hope to get away with it as their support is more rural. However the biggest government party (fractionally), the Conservative NCP is well entrenched in urban Middle class areas as traditionally the middle of the road and pivotal Centre party (now in opposition) was the leading party in rural Finland. 

Overview on the Guardian https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/jan/31/finland-strikes-set-to-bring-country-to-a-standstill . Article on the Finnish public broadcaster outlining the drastic cuts and more (there is no longer an English service I can find) https://yle.fi/a/74-20072592 eg Unemployment pay which currently averages €1600 per month will be cut by about €300¹ . The Swedish ‘4^th International’s’ summation corresponds to that of YLE. https://internationalen.se/innehall/utrikes/2023/finlands-strejk-ar-ocksa-var/

3 Union Federations (representing about 1.9 million in a population of 5.6 million, a density of 61% in 2022 https://ilostat.ilo.org/topics/industrial-relations/ ) are cooperating on a months’ long campaign against the cuts which started in Mid-January, had a major day of action on Feb 2^nd and another planned for Mid-February  (YLE above complains of major pain for employers).          

About 13,000 people participated in Thursday’s large demonstration in Helsinki’s Senate Square. (Photo: Markku Uusiniemi) – Courtesy of Left Alliance Regional website https://vasenkaista.fi/2024/02/nyt-riittaa-tuhannet-vaativat-loppua-hallituksen-kurjistamispolitiikalle/

The most important is the SocDem-Left political Union federation SAK https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suomen_Ammattiliittojen_Keskusj%C3%A4rjest%C3%B6_SAK with about 800K members² https://www.sak.fi/ajankohtaista/painava-syy/liittotoimet (a long list of strike actions, the strategy outlined by a member union is to force the stone-walling government and employers to the negotiating table -see conclusion for link).

Akava , Union federation for the ‘highly educated’ https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Akava (600K members) with a call to support Feb 2^nd Day of action. They emphasize compromise with the Right-wing government though. https://akava.fi/ajankohtaista/paremman-tyoelaman-puolesta-ulosmarssit/

STTK, The ‘non-political’ Union federation https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/STTK (500K members) with its support call for the strike (the joint organiser of Feb 2^nd Day of action along with SAK). They also favour compromise with the right wing government of course. https://www.sttk.fi/2024/02/01/sttk-ja-sak-tuhannet-suomalaiset-sanovat-stop-tyoelaman-ja-hyvinvoinnin-heikentamiselle/

Left of Centre Political Parties:

The Social Democrats https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Social_Democratic_Party_of_Finland
 have a hard left history (before the Communists split off in 1918) but are now the usual bunch of compromised Left neolibs (though maybe less so that elsewhere due the fairly solid if porous Welfare state which has been eroded since the 80s on and off). With an ave 25% of the vote and along with the pivotal (rural interests) Centre Party they ruled Finland for most of the time since the 2^nd world war³ . From 2003 their fortunes went into decline dropping to only 34 of 200 seats in 2015 as the Far Right ‘Finns’ party rose. However a trendy young leader Sanna Marin restored their fortunes somewhat after that (to around 40 seats), though losing power in 2023 despite improving her party’s result marginally (they were credited with keeping the Far Right out for 4 years- who were in government before in 2015-19). They have given rather tangential support to the strikes (accusing the government parties of not being honest about their intentions at the election). https://www.sdp.fi/ajankohtaista/sdpn-tuppurainen-orpo-antaa-vaaran-kuvan-tyomarkkinatilanteesta/ On Social media the strikes do seem to feature more though. https://www.facebook.com/sosialidemokraatit/

The Left Alliance https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Left_Alliance_(Finland) . Similar to the Swedish Left party they have transformed into an urban Left-reformist feminist party from the previous⁴ ortho ‘Communist’ tradition party/alliance (though previously with more solid working class support outside the major cities Helsinki and Turku, etc). Following participating in the 5 party Centre-Left coalition between 2013 and 23 they had their worst result ever ; 7.06% (in the 90s they had over 10% in each election). Their attitude towards the strikes is puzzling. Apparently they think leaving it to the unions and showing rather stand offish support is the way to go⁵. Only on a regional website in one of the old heartlands is there coverage of Feb 2^nd  for example. https://vasenkaista.fi/2024/02/nyt-riittaa-tuhannet-vaativat-loppua-hallituksen-kurjistamispolitiikalle/ . Official party support for the strikes is also a bit tangential, focusing on government lies https://vasemmisto.fi/175681-2/ if a bit more active looking on X https://twitter.com/vasemmisto .
 The alliance was severely stressed by the whole joining NATO debate and evidently felt pressurized into eventually supporting it to survive without a major split (as detailed in note 5 historical memory of the Winter War, Stalin’s 1940 invasion loomed large). https://www.ku.fi/artikkeli/4730878-li-andersson-olen-valmis-hyvaksymaan-suomen-nato-jasenyyden-koska-se-on-suomen-kansan-ja-suomen-eduskunnan-selvan-enemmiston-tahtotila?ref=popular (in the Alliance media). Recovering from that and the election reversal I conclude the Alliance may be a bit all over the place and lacking in confidence somewhat.

The Greens seem the usual excessively middle class party we have become used to but have bled that support from the 2 above I would guess (having been on a gradual upward trajectory until their plunge from 11.5 to 7% last year  https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Green_League . However their popular former Chair and Minister for Foreign Affairs Haavisto   https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pekka_Haavisto has garnered 26% (in the 1^st round) running as an independent for President against the NCP Conservative Stubb with 27% in January’s 1st round .

To conclude it would seem that despite the obvious increased class conflict evident in the attempts to slash the welfare state (again) and awakening of the unions in their Political Strikes, working class Finns will still vote for one bourgeois politician to keep a worse one out (sensibly enough it seems). As to the unions, SAK’s solidity is relative to the other federations, especially as they are a federation (with a member https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_Union_(Finland) publicly stating their aim is to force government and employers to negotiate https://www.ku.fi/artikkeli/4968056-60000-teollisuuden-tyontekijaa-lakkoilee-helmikuussa-neuvotteluesityksillemme-ei-ole-ollut-minkaan-asteista-vastakaikua-sanoo-teollisuusliiton-lehtonen⁶-), but at the moment SAK and its unions seem to be at the centre of the action.

————————————-

¹ This high rate of pay is earnings related and only lasts 3 months now. I believe the length of time was probably cut previously and recall hearing from a Finn that she felt better off on Social Welfare here than there several years ago due the overall cutbacks even then.

² Member unions divide political fund money between the 2 parties, favoring the SocDems 2 to 1 in the case of the Industrial Union. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Industrial_Union_(Finland) This I expect varies a lot.

³ The Conservative NCP sometimes barging into coalition though. -All major parties apparently agreed to a consensus line on major matters like the Welfare state and Foreign Affairs.

⁴In most other countries they would have been considered Stalinist tradition but this is hardly fair in Finland’s due their experience of Stalin’s 1940 invasion and hench-forth early ‘Euro-Communism’ (though there was a Stalinist minority wing and they apparently received Soviet funding). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Communist_Party_of_Finland

⁵Their main support seems to be among Urban youth who suffer from more precarious work, their candidate polling 12% in a Youth mock election recently. And unlike in Sweden there is little sign of a ‘4^th International’ organisation within (but those operating in Sweden and France appear to have individual contacts in the Left alliance). Link is via the French 4^th International site ESSF https://posle.media/language/en/in-politics-there-are-no-strategies-you-can-copy-paste/ (A Helsinki Left councillor talks about party history, its current broad/porous nature and the Ukraine dilemma on some 4^th International front? Russian/English site).

⁶Confusingly union membership is said to be merely 1.5 million here. There is a dispute to the overall number as those who have paid up to date full membership dues is less than the higher figure (with a considerable number of student and pensioner members in this case). https://fi.wikipedia.org/wiki/Suomen_Ammattiliittojen_Keskusj%C3%A4rjest%C3%B6_SAK

Argentina election Debacle aftermath

Tags

argentina, javier-milei, milei, news, politics

Jan 10th, 2024; Yes it is depressing, but the Far Left and overall Centre-Left failures both must be faced and learned from if possible.

 To introduce as simply as possible, there was a partial political meltdown (variegated by the type of election, ie worst in the Presidential) on the back of a particularly bad year (except the Far Left failure allowed a small Peronist recovery) after a decade of economic depression brought on by a succession of politicians of both establishment Right and Center-Left who caved to demands for re-payment of National debt which Argentina had tried to cancel, then deferred. Inflation (a significant problem since at least 2018) hitting 138% (and rising) recently and the economy described as being in ‘intensive care’ (though there has been economic growth since 2021 suggesting yet another situation where wealth/income is being re-distributed upwards) https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/argentina-braces-election-with-economy-intensive-care-2023-10-19/

With their now (it seems) worldwide propaganda expertise, the Far Right won the election media battle, somehow getting support for Milei’s scorched earth policy (in relation to removing the protections of the social state). Unlike 2011 here there is little positive to be said with debacles hitting both Center-Left and Far Left, unless the mistakes of both can be learned from (which is why it needs to be analysed of course). We have enough example here of the failure of Fianna Failism and Irish Laborism, so I shall concentrate on trying to analyse the failure of the Far Left to see if lessons can be learned.

It is hard to be concise especially at a remove. Let’s begin with the messy Left-Populist phenomenon known as Kirchnerism https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kirchnerism centred on the Left Populist wing of the long dominant Peronist Justicalist Party https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Justicialist_Party (Peron himself flirting with Fascism during World War 2, and allowing Nazi War criminals refuge after) has been in decline since at least 2015. Somewhat incredible that it evolved a serious Left, but somehow it did (it might be compared to the populism of the Republican tradition here). Kirchnerism’s candidate hasn’t been selected as the Peronist presidential candidate since its 2011 landslide victory due a combination of corruption scandals and the pressure of economic depression.

The once catch all Peronist coalition has shed the liberals of the left of the centre-right ‘Radical UCR’ (who went back home, imagine Fitzgerald FGers?) but (despite the internal shift to the center-right) retained that of Stalinist and Maoist tradition along with Left nationalist minor parties who still combine 7 seats in the lower chamber (across 3 ‘Communist’ and several other, including sub-coalitions-see the election wikis). Allied with broad Peronism have been the long dominant conservative Peronist Unions of the main CGT confederation (it declared solidarity with Israel in Oct 23) and off-shoots who have suffered a steep decline (This is implied by the rise of informal workers to 49%, see the paragraph on the Argentine Left debate -readily available membership figures are very out of date). https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/General_Confederation_of_Labour_(Argentina)
To boot the once (in the 00s) powerful Piquetero (unemployed) social movement/union has become fragmented into Peronist co-opted and Left aligned (itself very fragmented) bits. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Piquetero

As the once mighty (and badly divided between Right, Centre and Left leaning factions) populist Peronist+allies machine went into decline, there was only the Ultra-Left dominated ‘Worker’s Left Front’/FIT-U as an electoral alternative to the Left (whose sectarianism I imagine many found too hard to stomach). Their support peaked back at the 2021 mid-term election at 5.5%  close to the Far Right LLA with 7.2%. The main Peronist coalition at 34% and Establishment Right at 42% (an earlier symptom of the Peronist decline) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Argentine_legislative_election

In the recent 2023 legislative election the FIT_U went back to 3.3% , and 2.7% in the Presidential 1st round despite their candidate being seen as their best, indicating an abject failure on their part to be seen to be relevant, see https://www.rosalux.de/en/news/id/51444/who-votes-for-the-far-right-in-latin-america for stark election data showing how Milei won both the Youth and the less well off), the Peronist Centre-Left recovering to 38.5% (which proved a bit of a mirage in the Presidential 2^nd round, its Centrist candidate inspired so little he could only win 44% against Milei in the head to head), the Far Right LLA and Establishment Right having tied at about 26.5% each inn the legislative https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Argentine_general_election (with Milei 2nd in the 1st round and outpolling the established right by a big margin) leaving the field clear for the Far Right take off in the 2nd round of the Presidential election (after the deal with the Establishment Right). I note that ironically there was a weak economic recovery since 2021 (though seen as already sliding back into recession) which seems to have helped the now Centrist dominated Peronists a bit.

Milei’s expanded coalition unfortunately for now has a paper Lower House majority. His core alliance now has 39 seats, the Established Right 92 and the Schiaretti Peronist Right about 8 giving a majority for the Broad Right coalition with 139 seats to 108 main Peronist (including left leaning allies detailed above) and 5 Far Left FIT-U and 5 independents in the 257 seat house. There is a possibility that the left of the Liberalish Radicals (UCR and Rad Evolution) might eventually peel off as before (they control about half the Established Right seats, the other half are Macri Neo-con supporters in the PRO party), but for now they are allowing Milei howl at the moon while machinating behind his back. eg the established Right have their man over the supposedly to be abolished Central Bank, while Schiaretti also has a carve out. https://www.clarin.com/economia/javier-milei-ratifico-cerrara-banco-central-asunto-negociable_0_ynILNrdYhs.html (leading liberalish paper).

While the gravy train will thus continue for a select few, there is little doubt that the (further) major cutbacks for the many that the Established Right wanted all along will soon be coming. The distraction show of the ‘libertarian’ Far Right Milei fooling many sadly. I expect the Far Right were very good at playing on the resentments of informal workers, especially the young. It is not hard to imagine how that might work, given the especial cut-backs to youth social welfare here following 09.

The debate on the Left continues with a faction aligned with the (less unhinged part of the) 4th international arguing for a Broad Front Strategy urgently to resist the Broad Right https://poderpopular.com.ar/ (site of their sub coalition in Spanish) on the streets (and presumably in parliament). In particular they see informal and self-employed (ie non-union) workers as having been a big part of the Milei vote (49% of the workforce is thus claimed following years of de-unionisation, the figure was 43.5% in 2016) in this article which discusses the crisis of Peronism and weakening of the Working class (in detail with lots of facts). https://poderpopular.com.ar/2023/11/26/mas-alla-del-19-de-noviembre/
Whether the guys with the parliamentary seats (4 of the 5 FIT-U are aligned with the ultra-left PTS-‘Trotskyist Faction of the 4th international’) will drop their sectarian posing to go along with this strategy is beyond my ken (they seem to realise these are critical times but may have burnt too many bridges?). They can be found here in Spanish https://www.laizquierdadiario.com/ (there is some limited English translation at their USA comrade site to be found in the links there).
Anarchist leaning opinion can be found here (an affiliate of the 2^nd veering broad left) https://www.anred.org/ And here (an Indymedia look alike which studiously ignores electoral politics entirely. It claims many affiliates, so it may be that their politics are very diffuse). https://rnma.org.ar/rnma/

Those needed to fill out a broad front include the unions (the majority of which are still linked at the waist to the Peronists). The liberalish ‘Buenos Aries Herald’ report seems to indicate some will try to deal with the new government. I note Macri the last right wing President is apparently feared more than the seeming scarecrow figure of Milei at this moment. https://buenosairesherald.com/politics/javier-milei-election-victory-unions-and-cgt-reorganize-to-ease-the-panic Further Macri’s man Caputo has been confirmed as Economy minister. https://buenosairesherald.com/economics/javier-milei-confirms-luis-caputo-will-be-his-economy-minister If the Peronist unions can get special deals, are they that corrupted that they will they stand by while Milei and Macri savage the welfare state? Thankfully initial reaction is showing major opposition so far. Milei’s victory no doubt woke the Peronists up further.

To illustrate the out of touchness of the Argentine Social Democratic component (about 7 seats in 5 parts of the Peronist coalition), the German Social Democrat funded site NUSO (a bit of an overly lofty space with abstract pieces on world affairs) gives a left leaning analysis with some sense https://nuso.org/articulo/el-huracan-milei/ ( ‘The result of the election ended up being almost a carbon copy of that of Jair Bolsonaro against Fernando Hadad in 2018’ – which is obvious enough) but does not adequately account for the exhaustion of the Left Peronism known as Kirchnerism. Ex-president Christina Fernandez once a heroine of the masses could not even hold her own locality, let alone province (Santa Cruz in Patagonia). The Peronist coalition being defeated in both by around 2 to 1 margins https://www.clarin.com/politica/javier-milei-gano-57-votos-santa-cruz-cristina-kirchner-perdio-propia-mesa_0_uThv3xeAAu.html

Nothing is certain, but for now I would guess it might take years of struggle for a broad left project to assemble out of the ashes of the Peronist dream and train derailment of the Far Left. Perhaps FIT-U will eventually join with the Left sounding bits of Peronism to create one (akin to the Danish Red-Green Enhedlisten?), but just as likely these bits will continue to jostle for power within the Peronist coalition unless there are radical re-thinks as a result of struggle. Kirchnerism’s New hope is governor of Buenos Aries province Kirchoff where the Right wing tide was resisted (unlike the actual city). Local broad fronts have been created though as described in the conclusion of this mostly grim account. https://jacobin.com/2023/11/javier-milei-libertarian-authoritarian-argentina-peronism-inflation-presidential-election

Finally on the urgency of the current moment (If their Ultra Left ‘Trotskyist Fraction’ detractors were ever actually noticed, there may be a bit of irony with the DSA and Die Linke analysts getting one back at them).  https://www.rosalux.de/en/news/id/51474/argentinas-state-of-emergency

Although Argentina has long been seen as economically advanced by Latin American standards, yet more years of depression for the Working class and Precariat should eventually produce a new basic Populist Left project as happened in Bolivia. Will this be truly radical or another cloud of reformist hot air in yet another incarnation of populist Peronism (as yet another generation is persuaded by mainstream media to go with such)? Time will tell.

Argentina election Debacle

To sum as simply as possible, there appears to be a 2011 style political meltdown on the back of a particularly bad year after a decade of economic depression brought on by a succession of politicians of both Right and Center-Left who caved to demands for re-payment of National debt which Argentina had tried to cancel, then deferred. Inflation (a significant problem since at least 2018) hitting 138% (and rising) recently and the economy described as being in ‘intensive care’ (though there has been economic growth since 2021 suggesting yet another situation where wealth/income is being re-distributed upwards) https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/argentina-braces-election-with-economy-intensive-care-2023-10-19/

Unfortunately as the once mighty (and badly divided between Right, Centre and Left leaning factions) populist Peronist machine went into decline, there was only the Ultra-Left stanced ‘Worker’s Left Front’/FIT-U as an electoral alternative to the Left (whose sectarianism I imagine many found too hard to stomach). Their support peaked back at the 2021 mid-term election at 5.5% (an earlier symptom of the Peronist decline) close to the Far Right LLA with 7.2% . The main Peronist coalition at 34% and Establishment Right at 42% https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2021_Argentine_legislative_election

In the 2023 legislative the FIT_U declined to 3.3% at the recent election (and 2.7% in the Presidential 1st round), the Peronist Centre-Left recovering to 38.5%, the Far Right LLA and Est. Right tieing at about 26.5% each https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2023_Argentine_general_election (with Milei 2nd in the 1st round and outpolling the established right by a big margin) leaving the field clear for the Far Right take off in the 2nd round of the Presidential election (after the deal with the Establishment Right).

Milei’s expanded coalition unfortunately for now has a Lower House majority. His core alliance now has 39 seats, the Established Right 92 and the Schiaretti Peronist Right about 8 giving a majority for the Broad Right coalition with 139 seats to 108 main Peronist (including left leaning allies like the 3 ‘Communist Parties’ (2 with no seats, a Maoist tradition one having 2) and sub-coalitions of Left nationalists and other splinters who combine about 7 seats altogether afaik) and 5 Far Left FIT-U and 5 independents in the 257 seat house. There is a possibility that the Liberalish Radicals (UCR and Rad Evolution) might eventually peel off (they control about half the Established Right seats, the other half are Macri Neo-con supporters in the PRO party), but for now they are allowing Milei shout to the heavens while machinating behind his back. eg the established Right have their man over the supposedly to be abolished Central Bank, while Schiaretti also has a carve out. https://www.clarin.com/economia/javier-milei-ratifico-cerrara-banco-central-asunto-negociable_0_ynILNrdYhs.html (leading liberalish paper). Some liberal-ish news in English can be found here. https://buenosairesherald.com/

While the gravy train will thus continue for a select few, there is little doubt that the (further) major cutbacks for the many that the Established Right wanted all along will soon be coming. The distraction show of the Far Right Milei fooling many sadly.

The debate on the Left continues with a faction aligned with the (less unhinged part of the) 4th international arguing for a Broad Front Strategy urgently to resist the Broad Right https://poderpopular.com.ar/ (in Spanish) on the streets (and presumably in parliament). In particular they see informal (ie non-union) workers as having been a big part of the Milei vote (49% of the workforce is thus claimed following years of de-unionisation) in this article which discusses the crisis of Peronism and weakening of the working class. https://poderpopular.com.ar/2023/11/26/mas-alla-del-19-de-noviembre/ Whether the guys with the parliamentary seats (4 of the 5 FIT-U are aligned with the ultra left PTS-‘Trotskyist Faction of the 4th international’) will drop their sectarian posing to go along with this strategy is beyond my ken. They can be found here in Spanish https://www.laizquierdadiario.com/ (there is some limited English translation at their USA comrade site)

Those needed to fill out such a broad front include the unions (the leaders long used to cosy deals with the Peronists I assume). The liberalish Herald report seems to indicate some will try to deal with the new government. I note Macri the last right wing President is apparently feared more than the seeming scarecrow figure of Milei at this moment. https://buenosairesherald.com/politics/javier-milei-election-victory-unions-and-cgt-reorganize-to-ease-the-panic Further Macri’s man Caputo has been confirmed as Economy minister. https://buenosairesherald.com/economics/javier-milei-confirms-luis-caputo-will-be-his-economy-minister If the Peronist unions can get special deals, will they stand by while Milei and Macri savage the welfare state?

To illustrate the out of touchness of the Argentine Social Democratic component (about 7 seats in 5 parts of the Peronist coalition), the German Social Democrat funded site NUSO (a bit of a overly lofty space with abstract pieces on world affairs) gives a left leaning analysis with some sense https://nuso.org/articulo/el-huracan-milei/ ( ‘The result of the election ended up being almost a carbon copy of that of Jair Bolsonaro against Fernando Hadad in 2018’ – which is obvious enough) but does not adequately account for the exhaustion of the Left Peronism known as Kirchnerism.

So this is a situation in progress. Ex-president Christina Fernandez once a heroine of the masses could not even hold her own locality, let alone province (Santa Cruz in Patagonia) being defeated in both by around 2 to 1 margins https://www.clarin.com/politica/javier-milei-gano-57-votos-santa-cruz-cristina-kirchner-perdio-propia-mesa_0_uThv3xeAAu.html

Nothing is certain, but for now I would guess it might take years of struggle for a broad left project to assemble out of the ashes of the Peronist dream and car crash of the Far Left. Perhaps FIT-U will eventually join with the Left sounding bits of Peronism to create one, but just as likely these bits will continue to jostle for power within the Peronist coalition unless there are radical re-thinks as a result of struggle. Local broad fronts have been created though as described in the conclusion of this mostly grim account. https://jacobin.com/2023/11/javier-milei-libertarian-authoritarian-argentina-peronism-inflation-presidential-election

Although Argentina has long been seen as economically advanced by Latin American standards, yet more years of depression for the Working class and Precariat should eventually produce a new basic Populist Left project as happened in Bolivia. Will this be truly radical or another cloud of reformist hot air? Time will tell.

Italian regional elections

(held over 20-21st September, 2020)

Intro; Democratic party (PD) leader Zingaretti is the masked figure waving in the left- neoliberal/centre-left Repubblica lead article below ;

https://elezioni.repubblica.it/?ref=RHPPTP-DE

See also for map of regions (leading to specific results) https://elezioni.repubblica.it/2020/elezioni-regionali/

There is a messy Wiki in english of results so far this year (leading on to regional Wikis) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2020_Italian_regional_elections

7 regions were up for grabs, the centre-left (now including 5 star in Liguria in the north) held 3 and lost one, while the right solidified control of the remaining 3 (A referendum to drastically cut the number of parliamentarians was simultaneously approved by a large margin). My understanding is limited by having to use translation services .

   Prelude; In January the PD led centre left ( centro-sinistra ) coalition held Emilia Romagna (home of the now questionable Emilian (co-operative) Economic model started under the once dominant (Euro)Communist Party (PCI, that title now hijacked by a remnant Stalinist sect afaik) whose continued importance is argued over elsewhere) . After months of street mobilisation by left inclined youth movement Sardines, a Lega threat was repulsed. No one was sure how these elections would go either, with such a mobilisation not possible for one, and polls again predicting close results in 2 of 4 centre left bastions Tuscany and Puglia. Marche in the east was written off due local factors afaik (5 star insisted on their own list for one, there is no transferable vote system, but a complicated mix of 1^st past the post and d’Hondt Pr), with only Campania around Naples thought safe.

The populist extreme right consist of 2 parties, Lega descended from the separatist Lega Nord which once included supposed left nationalists like Salvini himself ,

https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/jun/22/matteo-salvini-a-political-chameleon-thriving-on-fears

and Brothers of Italy (FDL) descended from the neo-fascist MSI, strongest in the centre and south https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brothers_of_Italy

These 2 now dominate the so called ‘centre-right’ (centro-destra ) coalition, in fact Bersucloni’s Forza Italia and the older centre-right fragments are now just minor players, but a confusing factor is the lists of personalities like that of Lega’s Zaia, President of Veneto .

The centre-left also resorts to these personality lists , the PD’s DeLuca in Campania being the most significant .

  On the preliminary exit polls the reporting paper above called it a draw (increased turnout due the extended voting and the close opinion polling may have saved them again?) . Despite further increases for the extreme right, the centre left hel the 2 most important regions in doubt Tuscany and Puglia (the latter without Renzi’s centrist party or 5star which were nice if small bonuses for them).

   However the extreme right solidified their marginal control of the once centre-left Liguria around Genoa in the North and gained the long centre-left Marche (along the East coast) as well as holding Veneto by a landslide due personal popularity of the Lega leader Zaia, seen as a competent Salvini opponent within Lega. Valle D’Aosta a minor region in the north has it’s own localist politics (leaning well right wing afaik) which were strong in addition to the pop ext right Lega.

Again on the brightside, the centre left held Campania around Naples by a competing landslide. However the local PD president (the former communist) DeLuca courted the old centre-right vote big time (judging by his crediting them after the result) .

The overall result should secure Zingaretti’s (compared to Ed Milliband by Jacobin, see below) leadership of the (in part) communist tradition Democratic Party (PD) as the arch-neoliberal Renzi’s party flopped badly in regions where they ran in opposition to the main centre left (Puglia and Liguria) . The far left who ran 3 competing lists in Tuscany lost their last and only regional council seat there afaik. Their incoherence continues (see also the Jacobin Italia complaints below)

Despite their populist referendum gambit of reducing the size of the legislature passing with a large margin, it didn’t help them retain support, and 5 star are reduced to a minor party (as polls predicted). Unfortunately even where they joined with the PD in Liguria, Lega could not be stopped (it can be guessed Lega took a lot of their old support). Where they competed they were mostly reduced so far into single digits % as to not make a difference . Municipal council election were held as well, the analysis of which is beyond me as yet.

Afternotes;

Alternative coverage at the (sort of) old libertarian communist paper ‘Il Manifesto’. It allows 3 free reads every 5 days if you are registered and has a weekly English edition (the latter isnt good on Italy though) . It seems to agree with the assessment of the centre-left Repubblica in the main

https://ilmanifesto.it/sezioni/politica/

However the complete lack of excitement on both Jacobin’s main and Italian outlet is striking (compared to their close observing of the US and UK elections), As much coverage was given to the death of an old communist founder of Il Manifesto (also with Il Manifesto), and a not great piece on the coinciding referendum was written by someone in Australia. Paulo Gerbaudo an academic in the UK now, speculates on what the future might bring along with a scattering of other seeming desultory pieces . Some embarrassed bemoaning of the far left’s incoherent strategy while hoping for the emergence of ‘Democratic Socialism’ Corbyn or Sanders style .

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Un altro finale di partito

This translation of a desultory piece concentrating on Zingaretti last year might be summed up by ‘at least he’s not Renzi, but’ . The long depression of much of the Italian left is yet to be lifted. I hope they can find some room for hope in the results

https://www.jacobinmag.com/2019/03/italian-democratic-party-nicola-zingaretti-salvini

Somewhat late analysis in Italian which hopefully will be better translated than Google Translate can manage on the English site soon . It talks about the continued disarray of the Left of the left/far left (my understanding is far from complete, but a very muddled situation with 2 stalinistic ‘communist’ parties, a Trotskyist dominated coalition PAP that previously was wider, and a more reformist Sinistra Italia in places which is a remnant of the once sizeable Refondizione Communista which split with the neoliberalised side of the PCI who now exist in the PD. More ‘soft left’ bits appear to be in the centre-left coalition if not in the PD, but some of the harder left may have joined too). The loss of their last regional seat is confirmed (in Tuscany) and explained as a combination of tactical voting for the center-left and pointless sectarian lists/vote splitting. A yearning for better tactics is expressed but there does not seem any solid ideas on that front as they seem caught between working in the center-left and working outside it. On the wider front the extension of the great leader conundrum (personalization of politics exacerbated by the Pandemic) to Italian regional elections is examined .

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